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1 INTRODUCTION
Current newspapers are full of horric tales of “cyber-attackers”
threatening our energy systems. And, if not for the notorious “evil
state”-actor, it is the ongoing digitization necessary to enable in-
creasing renewable and volatile energy generation that threatens
our energy supply and thus the stability of our society. And while
the main approach seems to be to patch-up the detected vulnerabili-
ties of protocols, software and controller devices, our approach is
to research and develop the means to systematically design and test
systems that are structurally resilient against failures and attackers
alike.
Security in cyber-systems mostly should be concerned with es-
tablishing asymetric control in favour of the operator of a system.
In order to achieve this on a structural level at design time, repro-
ducible benchmark tests are required. This is notoriously dicult
for intelligent adversaries whose primary ability are adaption and
creativity. Thus, testing methods nowadays are either reproducible
and insuciently modelling attacker — or they involve unrepro-
ducible human elements. Reinforcement learning may be useful to
provide at least some adaptability of reproducible attacker models.
This work takes its motivation and rst practical implementa-
tion from the power system domain, but the work can directly be
applied to all highly complex, critical systems. Systems that may
benet from Adversarial Resilience Learning (ARL) are too complex
to be suciently described using analytic methods, i. e., because
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the number of potential states is to large and the behaviour is too
complex with too many non-trivial interdependencies.
This work introduces ARL, which provides a method to analyse
complex interdependent systems with respect to adversarial actors.
The foremost motivation is to provide a method for deterministic
analysis method for complex and large systems including some
degree of adaptivity of the simulated attackers.
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a novel
structure for training and application of Articial Neural Networks
(ANNs) that generalizes the approach of adversarial learning. By
setting up ANN-based agents in a competitive situation, the learning-
complexity is comprised not only of a highly complex system, but
also of competing ANNs whose changing state, manifested by modi-
ed behaviour of the system under consideration, has to be included
in the trained model. We assume that this provides a very inter-
esting new problem class for Reinforcement Learning (RL), as it
introduces a cyclic learning competition.
The paper is structured as follows. First, a brief introduction into
related techniques in machine learning and related work for complex
system analysis is given. The paper then denes the concept of
Adversarial Resilience Learning in Section 3, and introduces its
application to adversary testing in power system control in Section 4.
The paper is completed by a presentation of lessons’ learned and
results from an early proof-of-concept demonstrator in Section 4.2.
Itconcludes with a discussion and an outlook in Section 5
2 RELATED WORK
This work aims at exploring the feasibility of improving resilience
of complex systems using machine learning to train adaptive agents.
The term resilience is lacking a coherent and precise denition across
elds. Generally it denotes the ability of a system to withstand un-
forseen, rare and potentially catastrophic events, recover from the
damage and adapt by improving itself in reaction to these events.
Ideally, resilience is increasing monotonously throughout system
improvement. A useful simplication is observation of the chang-
ing behaviour of system performance as an artefact resulting from
resilience processes. Dierent formalisation of resilience processes
exist, but most distinguish subprocesses for planning, absorbtion
of damage, recovery (or self-healing) and improvement (or adap-
tion). [2]
See Figure 1 for an expression of a hypothetical system’s perfor-
mance suering twice from damaging events. Resilience is modelled
as a sequential process: Plan, Absorb, Recover and Adapt. [30] As
consequence of the rst event the performance of the system is
pushed below a failure threshold, i. e., the system fails to provide its
service. Improvement of the system is then achieved after recovery
as the system is able to keep the performance above the failure
threshold during the second event.
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Fig. 1. Resilience Process for system performance
2.1 Analysis and Stochastic Modelling
The main distinction of our approach as compared to game theo-
retic modelling and stochastic analysis is the use of co-simulation
and heuristic approaches instead of formal abstraction of complete
systems. The underlying assumption is, that a system-of-systems is
too complex, and malicious adversaries are too unpredictable to be
suciently analysed.
But similarly to Attacker-Defender Models, e. g., described in [4]
that at analysing an equilibrium between attackers and defenders
in dynamic systems, our work aims at heuristically approach an
estimate of the asymmetry of attacker and defender in these systems.
The approach of ARL structurally similar to the concept of Stack-
leberg Competition and related applications of stochastic analysis,
e. g., pursuit-evasion in dierential games [26]. These approaches
seem to only be applicable to scenarios that can be restricted to few
degrees of freedom. More realistic behaviours of opportunistically
acting threat agents within complex system-of-systems leads to an
explosion of states in analytic approaches.
Recent surveys seem to support this view. Referenced approaches
on power systems in [11] provide no details on the used game-
theoretic model and use ambiguous terminology of the researched
threat scenarios. Approaches in Machine Learning (ML) to tackle
complex problems, on the other hand, have, not only recently, been
very successful in providing novel, practical solutions.
2.2 Machine Learning
ANNs are universal function approximators, meaning that they can
be used as a statistical model of any Borel-measurable function
Rn 7→ Rm with desired non-zero error [9, 17, 24]. Already the
standard Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) (e. g., Elman [13]) has
the capacity to approximate any non-linear dynamic system [38],
and Siegelmann and Sonntag have shown that RNNs are turing-
complete [39].
In practice, a typical problem for which RNNs, especially struc-
tures containing Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) cells [23] or
Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) [6, 7] are used, is time series predic-
tion. Even greater memory capacity is achieved by neural turing
machines, introduced by Graves et. al. [20], which also counter
the learning problem that is inherent to the turing-completeness of
RNNs: in theory, a RNNs have the capacity to simulate arbitrary
procedures, given the proper set of parameters; in practice, this
training task has proven to be complicated. Neural Turing Machines
counter the complexity with a vastly increased addressable memory
space and have shown to be able to simulate simple, but complete
algorithms like sorting [ibd.].
Predicting a time series with an RNN constitutes the instantiation
of a (non-linear) dynamic system [3, 42, 44], i. e., the prediction is
the result of the system’s behavior, which is, in turn, modeled and
approximated by the RNN. Cessac has examined ANNs from the
perspective of dynamical systems theory, characterizing also the
collective dynamics of neural network models [5].
Dierent ways exist to train ANNs and RNNs. When using super-
vised training methods, the training set consists of both, vectors of
input and known output the ANN is expected to exhibit. Two dier-
ent classes of training algorithms are popular for this type of train-
ing, with gradient-decent-based algorithms of the Backpropagation-
of-Error family leading by far [8, 12, 28, 34, 35], followed by evolu-
tionary algorithms such as CMA-ES [21, 22, 33] or REvol [36, 43].
However, all optimization methods adapt the ANN to minimize a
cost function and not directly to create a model of a problem; this
happens only indirectly. As a result, ANNs can still be “foiled,” i. e.,
made to output widely wrong results in the face of only minor modi-
cations to the input. This eect and how to counter it is the subject
of adversarial learning research.
With unsupervised learning, the ANN tries to detect patterns in
the input data that diverge from the background noise. Unsuper-
vised learning does not use the notion of expected output [16]. A
modern application of unsupervised learning has emerged in the
concept of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). Here, one
network, called the generator network, creates solution candidates—
i. e.,maps a vector of latent variables to the solution space—, which
are then evaluated by a second network, the discriminator [18].
Ideally, the result of the training process are results virtually in-
distinguishable from the actual solution space, which is the reason
GANs are sometimes called “Turing learning.” The research focus
of ARL is not the generation of realistic solution candidates; this
is only a potential extension of the attackers and defenders them-
selves. ARL, however, describes the general concept of two agents
inuencing a common model but with dierent sensors (inputs) and
actuators (output) and without knowing of each others presence or
actions.
RL [25] describes a third class of learning algorithms. It extends
the process of adapting the weight matrix of any ANN by including
the notion of an environment into the training process. In RL, an
agent interacts with its environment that provides it with feedback,
which can be positive or negative. The agent’s goal is to maximize
its reward. The agent internally approximates a reward function in
order to achieve a high reward through actions for every state of its
environment. Initially, RL was not tied to ANNs [31]. However, as
the environment becomes more complex, so does the agent’s reward
function; ANNs are very well suited for function approximation or,
if the reward is based on a complex state of a world, i. e., a dynamic
system, RNNs are suitable.
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Fig. 2. Reinforcement Learning
For ARL, we assume a common model that is used by two distinct
agents: while one probes the model for weaknesses in order to nd
attack vectors, the other monitors the system and, unbeknowing
of the presence of the attacker or its actions, works at keeping the
system in its nominal state. Through this structure, the notion of
ARL assumes that the model—i. e., each agent’s environment—is not
completely known to the respective agent. Therefore, the usage of
RL readily suggests itself.
The abstract notion of a model can see multiple instantiations;
one such instantiation of ARL would be using a power grid as
the model considered by both agents. Ernst et al. employ RL for
stability control in power grids [14]. In their paper, they design a
dynamic brake controller to damp large oscillations; however, since
the reward function is easily well-dened, there is no need for using
an ANN for function approximation.
Figure 2 shows the general schema of RL, adapted from literature
for the power grid as the environment.
The concept we propose in this paper is related to Adversarial
Learning (AL) insofar, as both concepts use two distinct ANNs with
conicting objectives [19].
AL is the eld of exploiting vulnerabilities in learning algorithms
in order to aect the behaviour of the resulting (learned) system.
The prevalent technique is specially crafting inputs that lead to
unintended patterns being recognised. A secondary objective is to
use inputs that are not recognised as disturbing patterns by humans.
AL thus are a concept to implement a Stackelberg Competition in
neural networks.
A very recent example is given by Evtimov et al. [15], where
the authors showed how they were able to confuse known deep
learning image recognition algorithms by attaching markings to
physical objects.
AL neural network setups (for non-physical interventions) are
characterised by two output layers in sequence. The rst output
layer functions as the adversary, generating outputs from a given
input layer, i. e., the “real world inputs” The second output layer
represents the function of the original classier that has to learn to
correctly classify the original inputs despite the adversary’s eorts
to scramble the input.
3 ADVERSARIAL RESILIENCE LEARNING
ARL is distinguished from AL by the recurrent structure in which ad-
versary and defender are interacting. While GAN directly connect a
generating adversary with a detecting defender, ARL adversary and
defender interact only through the system they are using for input
and output. In this interaction adversaries are identied as agents
inserting disturbances into the system, while defenders provide
resilience control.
Denition 3.1 (Adversarial Resilience Learning (informal)). ARL is
an experimental structure comprised of two disjoint groups of agents
and a system or simulated system. The agents are distinguished
as attacker and defender by adhering to conicting optimisation
objectives. Both groups of agents receive their input from a, po-
tentially overlapping, set of measurements from the system. They
inuence the system through two disjunct sets of outputs connected
to controls in the simulated system.
3.1 Fundamental Notation and Model
The basic abstract scenario using ARL consists of two competing
agents and a system model. Each of the three elements resembles a
state transition. In order to establish a sound formal base, a deni-
tion of notation and processes of ARL is provided here. A summary
of notations used is given in table 1.
ARL consists of a set of agents, where each agent has a model,
denoted by A, and a model of a system,M. The agent model A
serves as a “blue-print” for the actual behavior of a running system;
similarly,M denotes a static model of a world. An index identies
a particular agent model, e. g., AA denotes the category of attacker
models, AΩ serves to denote the category of defender models. At
run-time, the models are instantiated. We denote instances of a
model with lower-case letters a, where the index denotes a particular
state of the model, such as at with t commonly referring a point in
simulation time. In the same vein,m denotes an instance of a world
model.
Each agent tries to maximize its rewards by approximating the
agent-specic performance function,
pa (mt ) . (1)
For an agent, the performance function pa (·) is equal to its reward
function in RL terminology. However, the notion of the performance
function lets us decouple agent behavior from the desired/intended
or undesired performance of the world, denoted by
p(mt ) , (2)
as the dierence between the world’s current performance to its
nominal performance, p∗.
Agents are categorized through their performance function, an
agent model is identied as attacker modelAA if his reward function
pa behaves inverse to the systems performance. The opposite is
true for agents from AΩ . That is, we can dene:
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Denition 3.2 (Attacker and Defender Classes). For all times t and
model instancesm ∈ M, the following provides a classication rule
for attackers and defenders:
a ∈ AA ⇒ pa (mt ) / p(mt ),
a ∈ AΩ ⇒ pa (mt ) ∼ p(mt ) . (3)
The performance of an agent is tightly coupled to an agent’s view
of its environment, i. e., the world. Each pa (·) can only be dened
in terms of the agent’s sensory inputs, i. e., the part the world it can
observe. The portion of the state of a system instance an agent a
can observe is denoted by
xa,t = ψa (mt ) . (4)
Given the sensory inputs of an agent a at t are given as xa,t , the
agent can act by approximating its reward function pa (·). This ap-
proximation is the agent’s activation of its internal dynamic system
approximator act(·); implemented through, e. g., an RNN, such that
acta : (at ,xa,t ) 7→ (at+1,ya,t+1) , (5)
where we assume that an agent is always able to observe its envi-
ronment throughψa (mt ), i. e., |xa,t | > 0, whereas it can choose not
to act, i. e., |ya,t+1 | ≥ 0.
An agent then acts on the system model through its actuators’
actions, ya,t , which are dened in its respective agent model, where
each agent has a specied set of actions of an actuator available at
any given time. Each agent denes an action policy for controlling
its actuators. In the simple case, the actions of an actuator are
mapped from labels [y1,y2, . . . ,ym ]> of, e. g., an internal RNN: Each
evaluation step of the performance function maps the sensor inputs
xa,t onto likelihood values ya,t for all labels of all actuators. The
common interpretation is that from each group of labels, the action
mapped from the highest-valued label is chosen as the one exerted
onto the system by the agent. However generally, an action policy
takes on a form that is suitable for the whole action search space,
such as a policy network steering a monte carlo tree search as has
been shown in [40]. Thus, an agent is acting through the evaluation
and application of its system approximator. This happens for each
agent 1, 2, . . . ,n. In brief, the systems behavior is heavily inuenced
by the set of all actuators that can be controlled by the respective
agents. Thus, an agent does not simple perceive a model (or a
part thereof), but the state of the model as the result of all agents
acting upon it. Thus, an agent does not simply create an internal
representation of a dynamic system, but of a dynamical system-of-
systems.
Finally, the simulator evaluates the actions of all agents applied
to the world model at t ,mt . This is represented by the evaluation
function,
eval : (yt ,mt ) 7→mt+1 , (6)
where the aggregated inputs and outputs over all agents are repre-
sented as vectors
xt =

xa1,t
...
xan,t
 , yt =

ya1,t
...
yan,t
 . (7)
Symbol Description
m ofM An instance of a system model
a of A An instance of an agent model
AA,AΩ Attacker model, defender model ( Theorem 3.2)
p(·) ∈ R+ Performance function
p∗,pf Reference performance of normal operation, of fail-
ure threshold
p(mt ) Overall performance of a system instancem at time
t (eq. (2))
pa (mt ) Performance with respect to the objectives of agent
instance a at t given the system instancem (eq. (1))
ψa Observation function mapping a system model mt
onto the inputs available to agent a, eq. (4)
xa,t Inputs to agent a at time t , eq. (4)
ya,t Actionsy of a at t , given observable state xa,t (eq. (5))
at , xt , yt Vectors of all agents’ states, observable agent inputs,
and agent actions corresponding a (eq. (7))
act Activation of agent a, transforming the observable
system instance states xa,t at t into an actions ya,t
for t + 1, altering agent instance states from at to
at+1 (eq. (5))
eval Application of action vector(s) of all agents yt at t ,
causing the world to transite from state mt to the
statemt+1 (eq. (6))
Table 1. ARL notation
If the activation vectors of the participating agents consider a dis-
joint set of controllers, i. e., the actions application is commutative,
the transition of the world state frommt tomt+1 is the result of an
aggregation of all agents’ actions yt . Non-commutative application
of actions is out of scope of this work.
3.2 Formal Definition
Using the notation introduced here and summarized for reference
in table 1, we dene the concept of ARL as model and connection
setup with transition process in the following way.
An setup in ARL is comprised of agents a ∈ A∪Ω, which include,
at least, one instance of each set A,Ω. Each agent is related to a set
of inputs Xa and a set of outputs Ya .
Further the setup requires a world modelm which provides a set
of sensors Xm and controls Ym .
The central process of ARL is the dynamic system-of-systems
view of a set of agents a0,a1, . . . ,an acting upon a shared instance of
a world model. Activation functions acta of agents and application
eval of agent agents to a wordl model form a cyclic sequence of
activation and application that transforms the states of model and
agents into a sequence of states as shown in g. 3.
An experiment of ARL is the execution of this sequence. The
resulting data of an experiment is the sequence of states, inputs and
outputs (mt ,at ,xt ,yt ), t ∈ {1, . . . ,n} as well as the initial setup
m0,a0.
Thus nally we can strive to formalise the idea by collecting all
components in a single scenario:
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Fig. 3. ARL sequence of execution
Fig. 4. Optimization Objectives
Denition 3.3 (Adversarial Resilience Learning Scenario). Any ex-
perimental setup comprised of agent instances a ofA of two oppos-
ing classesAA andAΩ and a system modelM, as well as, for each
agent instance a a reward functionpa (m, t), a mapping of observable
states xa,t , and action vectors ya,t .
ARL thus is the application of RL, as introduced in Section 2.2,
to iteratively improve the internal decision structure that deter-
mines the behaviour of an agent acta . The output of ARL then is,
depending on the exerimenters objectives, an observation of the per-
formance of the system modelM or a set of agents trained towards
the dened objectives.
3.3 Optimization Problem Statement
This section describes possible optimization problems that provide
the motivation for ARL.
ARL resembles a closed-loop control situation with (at least) two
conicting controls. Herein are distinguished two dierent optimi-
sation objectives that provide dierent uses of ARL. The dierent
uses, as depicted in g. 4, improve dierent elements to achive either
an improved threat tests, or a more resilient system. The primary
distinction is between evolving parameters of ANN in order to opti-
mize individual agents or step-wise advancing the structure of the
system model. Our concept itself is oblivious to the algorithms used
for optimization.
3.3.1 System Optimization. The primary objective is to nd the
inherent control asymmetry of a given control system to nally
recommend system designs that favor the defender over the attacker.
In control theory this could be expressed as a system, where for
all possible sequences of actions by the attacker for a given system
modelM there is at least one corresponding sequence of actions
for the defender and the resulting performance of the system will
never drop below a given failure threshold. This requirement can be
relaxed by dening a nite measure of failure that may be acceptable,
for example during an initiation phase.
Objectives of defender and attacker in control scenarios are fo-
cussed on system states measured by a model performance func-
tion eq. (2), as formally given in theorem 3.2. In general, we call an
agent defender if its objective is to keep the performance at least
above the failure threshold. We denote an agent as attacker if it
aims at pushing the performance below a expression for a failure
threshold, as seen in Figure 1.
We denote the objective of asymmetry — favouring defence of a
system — given a candidate system model instancem and defender
agent aΩ that
pf < p(mt ) for all t > t0,aA ∈ A . (8)
Which describes that the performance, for all potential attackers
a in A, there exists a defender a∗Ω , with given initial statemt0 , will
never fall below a dened failure threshold pf . To account for a
learning period we allow for a nite initialisation time until t0.
Improvement is achieved by evolutionary changes to the sys-
tem modelM, improved defensive agent models A or training of
defensive agents aΩ , as discussed in the following section.
3.3.2 Agent-Training. Training of threat agents aims at improv-
ing attack abilities, including the identication of previously un-
known attack vectors, in order to provide testing capabilities. Im-
proved threat tests allow to dene test requirements for system
designs that improve systems’ resilience against security threats.
One objective is to train threat agents that can be used as bench-
marks for future system designs.
An agent’s objective is implemented through a reward function
that is used within a reinforcement learning process that succes-
sively improves the agent’s behaviour towards that objective.
One particularly surprising success of RLs algorithms has been
the identication of solutions unthought-of by experts, especially if
applied to zero-information initial states. A two-agent, conicting-
objectives game only one potential learning structure usable with
ARL. But the concept allows potentially for all combinations of one-
or-many zero-information reinforcment agents and static or even
human-controlled competition.
4 APPLICATION TO POWER SYSTEMS
In this section an example application of ARL to adversarial control
in power systems is shown as a feasibility demonstration. We show
that ARL provides a novel approach to analyze fundamental control
asymmetries between intelligent attackers and defenders. The nal
aim of this application is to design and analyse system congura-
tions that are inherently favoring the defender in his objective to
stabilize system performance.
Applied on power systems, e. g., the performance function is
expressed as diversion from a specied range of acceptable state
values. The attackers objective is to force the system to a state
where one or more values are outside allowed ranges, its success
is measured by the amount and duration of the deviation. The
“defender” has lost the competition if the attacker is able to divert
any of the system’s parameters beyond the acceptable range.
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Fig. 5. ENTSO-E Operational Phases
Specic objectives for attackers can vary widely as there are
many dierent parts of a power system that can be aected in
order to disrupt service and reduce system performance. Attackers
may aim at demolition of connected machines or components of
the transmission and control system. Thus, to strive for a more
general specication of objectives, we better consider the objectives
of defenders and speciy a deviation from these objectives as “win”
for the attackers. The objectives for the defender are very well
dened in the power system domain.
Dierent specic requirements apply for dierent parts of the
power system. Common parameters to consider are voltage V in
V,1 frequency f in Hz, phasor angle ϕ in rad, real power P in W,
and reactive power in VAr. In general, phase synchronicity is more
important for high-voltage transmission grids, as asynchronicity
leads to harmonics in the power system, with potentially desas-
treous large power ows between large segments of the grid. For
the european transmission grid the operation guidelines, dening
conditions for four phases: normal, alert, emergency, and blackout,
shown in Figure 5, are dened in [1].
Similarly operational parameters exist for medium- and low-
voltage-grids, power generation and connected loads.
DIN EN 50160 species parameters for the operation of distribu-
tion grids. It denes that voltage has to stay between 0.9 pu and
1.1 pu. It is acceptable, by denition in EN 50160, that voltage drops
down to at least 0.85 pu for at most 5% of a week. Frequency must
only deviate from the nominal 50 Hz by at most 4% above or 6% for
not more than 0.5% of the year, i. e., less than 2 days overall. Normal
operation must deviate no more than ±1%. [10]
An attack, in this simulation is deemed successful if any require-
ment exceeds its dened limits.
Figure 6 shows the renement of the generic ARL-structure as
described in section 3 for the power grid scenario using ANN to
implement a single adversary and a single defender. Both agents
interact only through sensors and actuators that inuence dierent
controls in the power grid.
In the remainder of this section we introduce a Proof-of-Concept
(PoC) implementation of ARL using PandaPower [41] for static
1Voltage is often given in power unit, pu, which takes the value 1 for normal voltage.
E. g., if 110 kV is the nominal voltage in a distribution grid, 1 pu is 110 kV, and 0.9 pu =
0.9 · 110 kV = 99 kV.
Fig. 6. ARL ANN structure
grid simulation and the Keras-RL library [32] for implementation
of reinforcement learning for ANNs. First, a brief description of
the control scenario is provided, followed by a discussion of the
preliminary results.
4.1 Static Control Scenario
The objective of this proof-of-concept is to show the general fea-
sibility of using (multiple) ANN-heuristics and train them by re-
inforcement learning to modify controls in a static power system
simulation towards their objectives.
The simulation uses a simple medium voltage power grid, as
model from the static grid simulation pandapower [41]. The grid
contains four generators connected by six transformers to six loads.
For the PoC, we chose to only use voltage as state-indicator and
input to the reward of the attacker. The initial conguration of the
grid comprises a stable healthy state of the grid that would be held
up constantly if no control actions would be initiated.
Actuators in this scenario are tap changer, reactive power con-
trol, loads and generation levels as represented by the commonly
deployed and future automated controls in power systems.
The reward function for the attacker is shown at the bottom right
in Figure 9a. Initial trials pointed towards the inverse of a Poisson
Density Function centered on the nominal voltage unit. The reward
function thus resembles the objective for an attacker, providing only
positive rewards if the mean voltage deviates more than 5% from
the nominal voltage. The single agent in this demonstration had
been assigned direct control of every transformer, generator and
load in this scenario.
In terms of optimization from Section 3.3, the scenario instantiates
m fromM = Simple Example, with a single agent a ∈ AA, with a
parametrized normal distribution
pa (m, t) = −1[a∈AΩ]e−
(x−µ )2
2σ 2 − c, (9)
where c, µ and σ parametrize the reward curve, −1[a<AA] negates
the reward if a is an attacker2, and x =mean xa,t is the average of
all inputs.
2Where [] denote Iverson brackets [27]
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Fig. 7. ARL Demonstrator configuration structure
4.2 Demonstrator
In order to show the genearal feasibility of the concept, we imple-
mented a demonstrator for reinforcement learning in power control
scenarios. The current implementation uses static simulation in
PandaPower [41]. It supports free congurability of controlled sen-
sors and actuators of multiple agents, selection of ANN-algorithms
and -parameters, as well as dierent logging and output formats.
Each experiment is specied within a single conguration le,
in order to support documentation and reproducibility of experi-
ments. A experimental conguration (Figure 7) denes three major
simulation components: a grid model, one or more agents, and a col-
lection of result logs that collect results. At the time of writing, the
whole demonstrator is refactored to use the mosaik co-simulation
framework. [29, 37]
The interconnection between agents and grid simulation, i. e., the
inputs (sensors) and outputs (actuators), xa and ya respectively, are
separately dened for each agent.
The execution of the simulation is round based. The rounds are
advanced in steps according to a dened evaluation order of agents.
Agents are sequentially executed, a dened number of steps each.
The grid state is evaluated between each consecutive pair of agent
evaluation steps. After each step, the internal weights of an agent
are modied by the learning algorithm selected in the conguration
of an agent.
Current result monitors output the grid states at every node
of the grid into a grid-state-log. For the agents, a log consisting
of inputs, outputs and evaluated reward for the output is output
to a congurable le in CSV format. The results are graphically
evaluated as is discussed in Section 4.3 below.
4.3 Results
To show the usability of our demonstrator we pitched two very
simplistic agents with inverse reward functions (Figure 9a and Fig-
ure 9d) against each other, using the example grid shown in Figure 8a
as an arena. Both agents were assigned all voltage sensors as input
and we divided the actuators among their outputs. The attacker
was assigned control of all tab changers, representing a scenario
where a vulnerability in one type of controller was exploited. The
defender would be granted access to all generators and loads in this
scenario.
Figure 8 shows a late state of the simulation. Seemingly the
attacker gained the upper hand and has been able to increase voltage
levels beyond 1.05 pu. The grid representation in Figure 8a shows
that especially two central measure points (numbered 4 and 3) are
struck with very high voltage levels, represented by the length of the
bars rooted at the nodes, most likely sucent for the connected loads
to shut down or be damaged. The mean voltage level of the system,
depicted for steps 1900 until 2000, in Figure 8b shows that even the
lower voltages of other nodes, e. g., 11 and 9 are not sucient to
lower the mean voltage to acceptable levels. Thus, in this example
the attacker has been able to destabilize the grid, despite the eorts
of the attacker.
Evaluating the two agents in Figure 9 provides no immediately
conclussive cause for the loss of the defender. The cumulative num-
ber of positive rewards in Figure 9b for the attacker and Figure 9e,
show only small dierences. These asymmetries might be explained
by the order of execution, where the defender always acts in re-
sponse to the attacker. The current reward for the depicted step
in the simulation, depicted in Figure 9a and Figure 9d, shows that
the defender is evaluating a dierent mean voltage than the at-
tacker. Each reward is calculated after the actions of an agent, thus
this graphs show the results of two actions that both improved the
performance towards their own objectives.
In this simulation run, that contained a small random input to
the learning algorithm, the positive learning curve for both agents,
in Figure 9b and Figure 9e, is increasing right from the start of the
simulation. In preliminary tests with a lone attacker, the learning
process rst went through a lengthy phase where only little positive
rewards where achieved. Although we have no conclussive answer
for the reasons of this diverging learning behaviour, it shows at
least, that the interactions between adversaries have an eect on
their behaviour.
5 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work introduced Adversarial Resilience Learning (ARL), a novel
approach to analyse competetive situations in highly-complex sys-
tems using reinforcement learning with articial neural networks
as reproducable, self-improving agents. The concept can be seen
as an extension of Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), which
distinguishes itself by including interaction to a complex system
(simulation) in between the competing agents. This work is moti-
vated by the need to nd better methods to automatically evaluate
system behaviour under threat of maliciously acting, intelligent
threat agents. The main idea is, that groups of agents, modelled by
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(a) Grid Simulation (b) Grid performance (mean voltage) over time/evaluation steps
Fig. 8. Proof-of-concept ARL grid results
(a) Aacker reward function, based on mean
voltage
(b) Cumulative number of positive rewards over
training steps
(c) Aacker performance pa (mt ) over time (in-
verse mean voltage)
(d) Defender reward function, based on mean
voltage
(e) Cumulative number of positive rewards over
training steps
(f) Defender performancepa (t ) over time (mean
voltage)
Fig. 9. Proof-of-concept ARL agent results
Articial Neural Network (ANN), struggle to enforce their objectives
against agents with conicting objectives.
Pitching two—or more—ANNs with conicting reward functions
against each other may allow to dene more realistic tests for ad-
versarial or competitive situations. Using reinforcement learning
harbours the promise of nding novel strategies for both attack
and defense, which both can be used to strengthen the resilience of
systems during the design and testing phase of a power system or
individual components. ARL-based analysis should contribute to
building grid structures that are more resilient to attacks and train
both articial and human operators in better handling of security
incidents.
Generally, the concept may allow to estimate threat-related in-
dices, for example the maximum amount of control that an adversary
may be allowed to gain over a system, which leads to improved
and more eective recommendations for security directives and risk
mitigations.
Furthermore, we believe that ARL provides a valuable addition
to the increased complexity for adversarial learning. Agents in ARL
have not only to approximate the behaviour of a highly-complex
systsem, but also have to learn and adopt to changing behaviour of
this system due to the actions inicted by the competing agents. In
this way, not only the amount of control over a system provides a
source of asymmetry, but also power of the ANN.
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The concept of ARL and its ongoing implementation in the ARL-
Demonstrator only marks the starting point for in-depth research on
structural asymmetries of complex systems and protection against
learning threat agents. The demonstrator provides the abilities to
further research in a number of interesting directions.
Foremost is the analysis of structural resilience of complex sys-
tems, especially nding minimum control sets of critical compo-
nents that provide the most defensive capabilities, or estimates of
the structural strength of a system. The integration into our co-
simulation framework mosaik opens up the possibility of extending
the single system into a whole composition into an interdependent
system-of-systems. Introduction of multiple domains would, to give
one example, allow to analyse the eects of Information and Com-
munication Technology (ICT)-components onto the performance of
power systems.
Deeper extensions of the demonstrator itself will involve capa-
bilities of the defender to aect structural changes to the system.
This would allow to use Reinforcement Learning (RL) to identify
novel and more resilient structures. The dual ability for threat agents
would be the extension of control, i. e., simulation of further compro-
mise from within a system. Both activities require the introduction
of a measure of cost to the demonstrator.
This demonstrator further allows to analyse simulated systems
from the point of view of threat agents, by pitching the agent against
novel security measures, for example simulation of distributed coor-
dinated attacks. Combining this view with multi-domain scenarios,
would enable analysis of sophisticated, multi-level attack techniques
that involve, for example information hiding or emission of mislead-
ing information by attacker or defender. That means nding novel
ways of attack using a combination of illeagal and legal operations
and interdependencies between dierent systems. Consequentially
all these approaches would lead to the development of improved
designs and testing methods for highly complex systems.
We can only assume that this nally lead to more resilient designs
and defensive adaptable strategies — and, in the end, to improve-
ments for the security of supply, but at this stage of the work, the
rst results are very satisfying.
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